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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED *OR 
I. \"\ hclln I ihi |IHI}JJIH:II( end rt*il nil human I I , "OiOw .-II'M^ J - / 5 , the 
defendant requested a hearing so that damages coujd be contested. 
Preservation: This issue was preserved in Argonaut ' s Objection to Proposed Order 
and Motion for Hearing on Remaining Issues HCUJK IIUS . i - > - i :ffs ' 
ai • *: ,. ; .-. :).. \ i : . i .1 -.;,«*( ,o j-,,i. b object ion to 
^ v t:tc hnU>, and Argonaut Insurance Company ' s Objection to Judgment.4 
Standard of Review: "Constitutional issues, including that of due process, are 
questions of law w i n d i [tl le coi irt] review [s] for correctness." : : ) ' I l ie Sii.pi ei i. le Coi u t 
reviews a disti ic t ecu irt's t i ilii igs : i it i r i< :>tic:>i is i n idei I Itah "Rules of Civil Procedure Rules 
59 anu oO ioi an abuse of discretion.6 
'R. I 3 3 4 d 3 3 \ 
2 ] ' :: 1449. 
3R. 1454-1455. 
4i ». 
5State in Interest of KM. 0<n P 2d 576, 578 (Utah App 7 098). 
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II. Whether the court was incorrect not to enter judgment against Wadman 
Corporation who was the statutory employer as previously found by this court. 
Preservation: This issues was preserved in Argonaut Insurance Company's 
Objection to Judgment.7 
Standard of Review: "A motion or action to modify a final judgment is addressed 
to the discretion of the trial court, the exercise of which must be based on sound legal 
principles in light of all relevant circumstances."8 
III. Whether the court abused its discretion by failing to take evidence on the status of 
the relationship between Argonaut and Wadman. 
Preservation: This issue was preserved in Argonaut's Objection to Proposed Order 
and Motion for Hearing on Remaining Issues Before this Court,9 Objection to Plaintiffs' 
and Wadman's Motion to Enter Judgment,10 and Argonaut Insurance Company's 
Objection to the Minute Entry.11 
Standard of Review: Appellate Courts review a district court's decision to not 
allow evidence for an abuse of discretion.12 
"Id. 
*Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431, 434 (Utah 1993). 
9R. 1334-1335. 
10R. 1448-1449. 
nR. 1454-1455. 
nBee v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 2009 UT App 35, ^ [9, 204 P.3d 204. 
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IV. Whether the Labor Commission has exclusive jurisdiction to determine allowable 
benefits when they are in dispute and whether interest should be charged and at 
what rate. 
Preservation: This was preserved in Argonaut Insurance Company's Objection to 
Judgment.13 
Standard of Review: "Whether the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction to 
determine entitlement to workers' compensation benefits \s an issue of law subject to a 
correctness standard of review."14 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
United States Constitution Amendment XIV § 1 
All persons born or naturalized in the United State^, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State jvherein they reside. No State 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person withii^ its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
Utah Constitution Article I § 7 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(d)(2) 
How assessed. The party who claims his costs mufet within five days after the entry 
of judgment serve upon the adverse party against whom (posts are claimed, a copy of a 
13R. 1519-1520. 
uSheppick v. Albertson 's, Inc., 922 P.2d 769, 773 |(Utah 1996). 
3 
memorandum of the items of his costs and necessary disbursements in the action, and file 
with the court a like memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to the affiant's 
knowledge the items are correct, and that the disbursements have been necessarily 
incurred in the action or proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs claimed may, 
within seven days after service of the memorandum of costs, file a motion to have the bill 
of costs taxed by the court. 
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the time of or 
subsequent to the service and filing of the findings of fact and conclusions of law, but 
before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be considered as served and filed on the 
date judgment is entered. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 59(a)(1), (a)(5), (a)(6), and (a)(7) 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to 
all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the following causes; 
provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an action tried without a jury, the 
court may open the judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend 
findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct 
the entry of a new judgment: 
(a)(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or any 
order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from having 
a fair trial. 
(a)(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under the 
influence of passion or prejudice. 
(a)(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that 
it is against law. 
(a)(7) Error in law. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b) 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; 
fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of 
justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or 
proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been 
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore 
4 
denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or o^her misconduct of an adverse 
party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been [satisfied, released, or 
discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise 
vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective 
application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. 
The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not 
more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A 
motion under this subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its 
operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action 
to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for 
fraud upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by 
motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action. 
Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1(2) (West 2010) 
(2) Unless parties to a lawful contract specify a different rate of interest, the legal 
rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, &oods, or chose in action shall 
be 10% per annum. 
Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-4 (West 2010) 
(3)(a) Except as otherwise provided by law, other (bivil and criminal judgments of 
the district court and justice court shall bear interest at th^ federal postjudgment interest 
rate as of January 1 of each year, plus 2%. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401(2) (West 2002) 
(2) The responsibility for compensation and payment of medical, nursing, and 
hospital services and medicines, and funeral expenses provided under this chapter shall 
be: 
(a) on the employer and the employer's insurance barrier; and 
(b) not on the employee. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-407(ll)(a) (West 2002) 
(1 l)(a) Subject to appellate review under Section j$4A-l-303, the commission has 
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine whether the {reatment or services rendered to 
employees by physicians, surgeons, or other health providers are: 
(i) reasonably related to industrial injuries or occupational diseases; and 
(ii) compensable pursuant to this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease 
Act. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-420(3) (West 2002) 
(3) Awards made by final order of the commission shall include interest at the rate 
of 8% per annum from the date when each benefit payment would have otherwise become 
due and payable. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case originated with a declaratory judgment action requesting the court to 
declare duties of the parties involved in the construction of the Santa Clara Intermediate 
School (the "Project") for Washington County School District which elected to participate 
in the Owner Controlled Insurance Program ("OOP") sponsored by the State of Utah. 
The main dispute is who is responsible to pay workers' compensation benefits to Cory 
Searle ("Mr. Searle"), an employee of Iverson Steel and Erection Company ("Iverson") 
who was injured while working on the Project.15 Argonaut Insurance Company 
("Argonaut") filed a motion for summary judgment against Iverson Steel claiming that no 
contract existed between them and thus no coverage could be afforded to its employee.16 
The district court granted the motion and WCF appealed. This Court found that no 
contract existed between Argonaut and Iverson, but that Argonaut would have to pay Mr. 
Searle's benefits because it was the insurance carrier for Wadman Corporation 
15R. 135. 
16R. 424-553. 
6 
("Wadman"), the statutory employer of Mr. Searle.17 It thqn remanded the case to the 
district court for "action consistent with this opinion."18 
On remand, Argonaut requested a hearing to allow 
policy between Wadman and Argonaut and the amount or benefits due to Mr. Searle.19 
The coverage under the insurance policy had never been before the district court and Mr. 
Searle's benefits had not been determined by the Labor Commission, which has exclusive 
jurisdiction over the determination of benefits. Without a 
proper damages could not be assessed. Despite Argonaut' 
the court to determine the 
resolution of these issues, 
s objections, the district court 
entered judgment based on a judgment submitted by WCIf. Because the district court 
overruled Argonaut's objections, it did not have an opportunity to present contrary 
evidence to the damages, costs, and interest submitted by |WCF. Argonaut appeals the 
entry of judgment by the district court. 
STATEMENT OF FAClfS 
Nature of the Case: The Washington County Schobl District was the owner of the 
Project and Wadman was the successful bidder to be the general contractor for the 
Project.20 As part of the bid specifications, the requirements of the State of Utah OCIP 
Manual were incorporated into the final contract betweerj Wadman and the Washington 
17 R.1332. 
l
* Workers' Compensation Fund v. Wadman, 2009 JUT 18, fU, 210 P.3d 277. 
19R. 1334-1335. 
20" R. 137. 
County School District.21 The OCIP Manual states that it does not provide coverage 
interpretations and that the policy governs.22 After the project began, Wadman hired 
Iverson because its original steel erection subcontractor was behind schedule.23 Iverson 
began work on January 28, 2002.24 On February 7, 2002, Mr. Searle was injured when he 
fell from a second story level to the concrete floor below.25 Iverson's enrollment form 
was submitted on February 8, 2002.26 Argonaut issued a workers' compensation policy to 
Iverson effective February 8, 2002.27 The case was filed as a declaratory relief action to 
determine who was responsible to pay benefits to Mr. Searle.28 
Procedural History: This case originated in May of 2002 when the Workers' 
Compensation Fund ("WCF") filed a complaint for declaratory relief against the State of 
Utah Department of Administrative Services, Department of Risk Management, Willis of 
Utah, Inc., Washington County School District, Wadman, and Argonaut.29 Iverson 
21R. 462. 
22R. 581. 
23R. 506-507. 
24R. 519. 
25R. 525-526 
26R. 499. 
27R. 529. 
28R. 135. 
29R. 1-12. 
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assigned its rights to WCF30 and WCF filed an amended complaint naming itself and 
Iverson as plaintiffs on November 1, 2002.31 After discovery, Argonaut filed a motion for 
summary judgment.32 The motion was based on the fact that Argonaut did not have a 
contract of insurance with Iverson or Mr. Searle.33 All defendants but Wadman also filed 
motions for summary judgment.34 WCF stipulated to a dismissal of Willis of Utah, Inc.35 
The district court granted the motions for summary judgment and Argonaut, State of Utah 
Department of Administrative Services, Division of Risk Management, and Washington 
prejudice 36 County School District were dismissed from the case with 
WCF and Iverson appealed the orders granting summary judgment.37 Wadman also 
appealed.38 After the appeal was filed, but before oral argument, WCF settled with 
Washington School District and the Division of Risk Management.39 Prior to a mediation, 
30R. 56-58. 
31R. 149 and 134-147. 
^ R 424-426. 
33R. 435. 
34R. 554-705. 
35R. 1225-1230. 
36R. 1237-1251. 
37R. 1252-1254. 
38R. 1264. 
39R. 1289-1291. 
Wadman assigned its Rights to WCF.40 WCF advanced four reasons that Argonaut was 
responsible to pay the benefits to Mr. Searle. Those arguments were (1) Wadman was 
Argonaut's agent, (2) Iverson's employees were loaned employees, (3) Argonaut must 
provide coverage because the Project was an OCIP project and Argonaut was the OCIP 
insurer, and (4) Wadman was the statutory employer of Mr. Searle and Argonaut must 
provide coverage as Wadman's insurer.41 
This Court rejected all but the last of WCF's arguments.42 This Court found 
Wadman to be Mr. Searle's statutory employer, that Argonaut was Wadman's insurance 
carrier, and remanded the case to the district court for action consistent with its opinion.43 
Once back in the district court, Argonaut objected to WCF's proposed order and made a 
motion for a hearing on the remaining issues.44 Specifically, Argonaut sought a review of 
the policy that controlled the relationship between Argonaut and Wadman and an 
opportunity to present evidence regarding issues not addressed by this Court pursuant to 
its due process rights.45 Argonaut also filed an Objection to Plaintiffs' and Wadman's 
Motion to Enter Judgment again stressing the need for the determination of evidentiary 
40R. 1302 
"Id. 
42R. 1322. 
43R. 1332. 
44R. 1334-1335. 
45R. 1338-1341. 
10 
issues.46 The district court overruled Argonaut's objection^ finding there were no issues 
remaining.47 Argonaut objected to this judgment.48 This objection was also overruled and 
the district court and entered judgment against Argonaut 4* 
judgment asserting that it should have been entered against Wadman, the support for 
damages was insufficient and inconsistent with applicable 
Argonaut objected the 
law, and that the Labor 
Commission should determine the benefits due to Mr. Seqrle.50 The district court again 
overruled Argonaut's objection and entered a final judgment on February 10, 2010.51 
Argonaut filed its Notice of Appeal on March 8, 2010.52 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The district court erred when it overruled Argonauts objections and motions in 
opposition to the entry of judgment. Specifically, the district court should have allowed a 
hearing on damages, entered judgment against Wadman Corporation, and taken evidence 
on the relationship between Argonaut and Wadman. Also] the district court lacked 
jurisdiction to determine the workers' compensation benefits due to Mr. Searle and 
46R. 1448-1449. 
47R. 1451-1452. 
48R. 1454-1455. 
49R. 1476-1482. 
50R. 1519-1520. 
51R. 1533. 
R. 1548. 
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applied the wrong interest rate. 
No Hearing on Damages: The district court entered judgment against Argonaut for 
$790,484.59 based on cursory support by WCF and not allowing Argonaut to present 
evidence in violation of Argonaut's due process rights. Argonaut made several objections 
putting the district court on notice that its rights were in jeopardy. Argonaut also objected 
after the judgment was entered, giving the district court the opportunity to correct the 
error pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 59 and/or 60. The district court should 
have allowed a hearing to determine the proper amount of damages. 
No Judgment Against Wadman: This Court previously found that Wadman 
Corporation was the statutory employer of Mr. Searle. The Workers' Compensation Act 
requires that employers and their insurance carriers be responsible for the payment of 
benefits. The district court's refusal to include Wadman on the judgment was a violation 
of the Workers' Compensation Act and prior Utah case law. 
No Evidence on the Relationship Between Wadman and Argonaut: The district 
court ruled that all coverage issues were determined by the Supreme Court. However, the 
OCIP Manual clearly states that the policy governs any coverage interpretations. The 
policy at issue in this case has never been put in evidence or interpreted by the court. 
Before Argonaut can be required to pay Mr. Searle's benefits, the policy must be 
interpreted to determine the type and amount of benefits to which Mr. Searle is entitled. 
Labor Commission has Exclusive Jurisdiction Over Benefits: In entering judgment 
against Argonaut, the trial court effectively determined the type and amount of workers' 
12 
compensation benefits due to Mr. Searle. The Workers' Compensation Act gives the 
Labor Commission exclusive jurisdiction over the determination of benefits. The district 
court recognized this in its judgment. Despite it knowledge of the Labor Commission's 
jurisdiction, the district court set the benefits for Mr. Searle. Argonaut should have the 
opportunity to defend Mr. Searle's claims in front of the Labor Commission. 
In addition, the district court used interest rates app 
judgment. The Workers' Compensation Act sets the interest rate for workers' 
compensation claims and this Act governs the benefits due 
icable to contracts in its 
in this case. The district 
court's judgment should be corrected using the correct interest rate. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Whether the Judgment Entered on January 11, zOlO was allowed when the 
defendant requested a hearing so that damages could be contested 
After receiving the case on remand, Judge Lindber^ entered a preliminary 
judgment on January 11, 2010 based on a proposed order drafted by the WCF.53 This 
judgment was finalized on February 10, 2010.54 However, Argonaut objected to the 
WCF's proposed order prior to the entry of the January 11|, 2010 order. 
On September 10, 2009, Argonaut filed its Objection to Proposed Order and 
Motion for Hearing on Remaining Issues Before this Cou|t, pursuant to plaintiffs 
53R. 1476. 
54R. 1533. 
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complaint for declaratory relief.55 One of the remaining issues before the trial court was 
the amount of damages. Argonaut again objected to the WCF's Motion to Enter Judgment 
on October 14, 2009.56 The WCF's proposed order ignored several evidentiary issues 
such as the amount of damages that the trial court needed to rule upon. 
Despite these objections and the need for a hearing to determine the amount of 
damages, Judge Lindberg entered a minute entry on December 11, 2009 overruling 
Argonaut's objections.57 However, in overruling the objections, the trial court also 
recognized that Argonaut should have the opportunity to present a defense regarding 
damages. The court stated 
once the Court has received and reviewed WCF's memorandum in support 
of taxable costs and "necessary disbursements in the action," and Argonaut 
has had an opportunity to respond, see Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
54(d)(2), the Court will consider the submissions and, as necessary, enter 
an appropriate supplement to the Judgment.58 
Argonaut was never given an opportunity to respond. Argonaut objected to the 
Minute Entry again asking that the "proper evidence be evaluated before an Order 
is actually entered ...,"59 WCF filed its memorandum in opposition to this objection 
R. 1334-1335. 
»R. 1448-1449. 
'R. 1451-1451. 
:R. 1451 (emphasis added). 
R.1455. 
14 
on December 22, 2009.60 Pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 7(c)(1), 
Argonaut should have had the opportunity to file a reply memorandum. Instead, 
the trial court entered a judgment on January 11, 2010.61 
The district court's entry of judgment was imprope^. Argonaut objected to 
the entry of this judgment because it allowed WCF to recolver administrative costs, 
adds prejudgment interest, and because the Labor Commission has exclusive 
jurisdiction over determining the amount of monies paid.6] This judgment was also 
inconsistent with this Court's prior decision in this case. This Court found that 
Wadman was the statutory employer of Mr. Searle and remanded the case back to 
the district court for "action consistent with this opinion.' >63 On remand, the proper 
action for the district court would be to enter a judgment stating that Wadman was 
the statutory employer of Mr. Searle and then transfer the case to the Labor 
Commission to determine the benefits due to Mr. Searle. instead, the district court 
entered judgment against Argonaut and awarding WCF damages it was not entitled 
to receive. 
Because the district court did not follow this Court 's decision, Argonaut 
never had an opportunity to rebut the damages claimed by WCF. WCF filed for 
60R. 1457. 
61R. 1476 and 1478-1482. 
62 R.1519-1520. 
63
 Workers' Compensation Fund v. Wadman Corp.,|2009 UT 18, ^ 41, 210 P.3d 277. 
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declaratory relief in this action asking the court to determine who was responsible 
to pay workers' compensation benefits..64 The district court's award of damages to 
WCF including administrative costs and interest at 10% exceeded the relief sought 
in the complaint for declaratory relief. WCF's action for declaratory relief does not 
entitle it to administrative costs or interest at 10%. Although the Utah Declaratory 
Judgment Act allows a court to provide supplementary relief, it also requires that 
the adverse party be allowed to respond.65 Despite these objections, the trial court 
finalized its judgment on February 10, 201066 without giving Argonaut the 
opportunity to respond to WCF's claims to damages. The trial court erred in 
entering judgment against the objections of Argonaut. 
The district court's failure to hold a hearing on damages violated Argonaut's due 
process rights. Also, the district court's overruling of Argonaut's objections to the 
judgment constituted an abuse of discretion in violation of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
59 and/or 60. 
A. The District Court's Failure to Hold a Hearing on Damages Violated 
Argonaut's Due Process Rights. 
The trial court's entry of judgment on January 11, 2010, which was finalized on 
February 10, 2010, without allowing a hearing regarding damages deprived Argonaut of 
64R. 134, 135. 
65See Utah Code Ann. 1953 § 78-33-8 (2002). 
66R. 1533. 
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its right to due process of law. The trial court's actions denied Argonaut the opportunity 
to defend itself from WCF's claims of damages. "An elementary and fundamental 
requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice 
reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the 
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections."67 
Argonaut has not been allowed to present its objections. 
Argonaut has not been afforded the opportunity to present its objections to the 
amount of damages because the district court refused to alfow a hearing. Instead, the 
district court accepted the amount of damages unilaterally 
provided by WCF as to the amount of damages were cursory computer printouts.68 These 
printouts had no foundation and do little to support WCF's claim to damages. Also, the 
WCF failed to provide any evidence of the administrative 
authority showing they are authorized to receive such costte. Argonaut is entitled to have 
WCF prove the amount of damages and present its own evidence regarding damages. 
'Parties to a judicial proceeding are entitled to notice 'thai 
considered by a court' and must be given 'an opportunity TO present evidence and 
set by WCF. The only support 
bosts incurred or cite any 
a particular issue is being 
61
 Jackson Construction Co. v. Marrs, 2004 UT 80, flO, 100 P.3d 1211 (quoting 
Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 30^, 314 (1950)). 
68 R. 1514 and 1518. 
R. 1481. 
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argument on that issue before decision."70 Also, "[i]t is elementary that a court may not 
make findings binding upon a defendant without a hearing, or an opportunity to be 
heard."71 Argonaut was not provided an opportunity to present evidence regarding 
damages in violation of its due process rights guaranteed by the United States and Utah 
Constitutions.72 
B. The District Court Abused its Discretion in Not Treating Argonaut's 
Objections as Motions Under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 59 and/or 
60. 
Additionally, WCF has argued that there is no Utah Rule of Civil Procedure that 
allows Argonaut to seek relief from the judgment entered against it.73 However, there are 
at least two rules that allow Argonaut to challenge the judgment entered in this case. 
Those rules are Rule 59 and Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
1. Argonaut's objections to the judgment should be treated as a 
motion for new trial or amendment of judgment under Rule 59. 
Rule 59(a) provides 
on a motion for a new trial in an action tried without a jury, the court may 
open the judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony, 
amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and 
70State in Interest of KM, 965 P.2d 576, 579 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting Plumb v. 
State, 809 P.2d 734, 743 (Utah 1990). 
lxRiggins v. District Court of Salt Lake County, 51 P.2d 645, 660 (Utah 1935). 
11
 See U.S. Constitution, Amendment XIV, § 1 and Utah Constitution Article I § 7. 
13See R. 1463 (WCF is "unaware of any Utah Rule of Civil Procedure that provides 
for such redundant pleadings.") and R. 1523 ("Once again, Argonaut cites to no Utah Rule 
of Civil Procedure or other authority for its right to object at this procedural point...."). 
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conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment 
Such action by the trial court is allowed under a variety o circumstances. Those that are 
applicable to this case are irregularity in the proceedings of the court by which either 
party was prevented from having a fair trial, excessive or 
insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other 
Argonaut was not afforded a fair trial because it was not allowed a hearing on 
damages. The damages awarded against Argonaut are likely excessive because Argonaut 
has not been given the opportunity to rebut the claims of WCF. Finally, the evidence 
presented by WCF as to damages is insufficient to justify) the award. WCF only provides 
two pieces of paper to justify $790,484.59 in damages. 
The fact that Argonaut's filings were captioned "objections" rather than "motions 
for new trial" is immaterial. "If the nature of the motion can be ascertained from the 
inadequate damages, 
decision, and error in law.74 
»75 substance of the instrument,... an improper caption is not fatal to that motion. 
Argonaut's objections clearly stated that the entry of judgment would be and was 
improper. Argonaut's objections were sufficient to act as motions for new trial or 
amendment of judgment and the trial court abused its discretion in not allowing 
Argonaut to present evidence to rebut WCF's claims as t<p the amount and nature of 
damages. 
74See Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(1), (a)(5) (a)(6) and (a)(7). 
75Armstrong Rubber Co. v. Bastian, 657 P.2d 13^6, 1348 (Utah 1983). See also 
Howard v. Howard, 356 P.2d 275, 276 (Utah 1960). 
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2. Argonaut's objections should be treated as a motion for relief 
from judgment or order pursuant to Rule 60(b). 
If Argonaut's objections cannot be considered as a motion for new trial pursuant 
to Rule 59, the objections should be treated as motions for relief from judgment pursuant 
to Rule 60(b). This rule provides that uon motion and upon such terms as are just, the 
court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party ... from a final judgment."76 Relief 
from a final judgment is allowed for any reason "justifying relief from the operation of 
the judgment."77 As was noted above, the fact that the objections may not have been 
correctly captioned is immaterial. 
"It is well established that 60(b) motions should be liberally granted because of 
the equitable nature of the rule. Therefore, a district court should exercise its discretion 
in favor of granting relief so that controversies can be decided on the merits rather than 
on technicalities."78 Argonaut was deprived of an opportunity to address the damages 
issue on the merits because the trial court refused to have a hearing and instead instituted 
a judgment based on the unilateral assertions of WCF. The trial courts repeated 
overruling of Argonaut's objections were a series of "misfortunes which prevented] the 
presentation of a claim or defense"79 and this Court should reverse the trial court's 
76Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). 
77Id. 
1%Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, f 54, 150 P.3d 480. 
19Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 260 P.2d 741, 742 (Utah 1953). 
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rulings and require a hearing on damages. 
II. Whether the District Court was Incorrect not t^ Enter Judgment Against 
Wadman Corporation who was the statutory employer as previously found 
by the Supreme Court. 
The district court erred in entering judgment only igainst Argonaut. This Court 
found that Wadman was the statutory employer of Mr. Searle.80 Utah Code Ann. § 34A-
2-401(2) provides that responsibility to pay benefits is "on the employer and the 
employer's insurance carrier."81 As the statutory employe^* of Mr. Searle, Wadman is 
also liable for benefits due to Mr. Searle. 
Utah courts have repeatedly found that statutory employers are liable for 
compensation benefits. In BB & B Transportation v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 893 
P.2d 611 (Utah App. 1995), the court found that a truckeij driver's employer and 
statutory employer were both responsible for workers' compensation benefits.82 Also, 
the court in Pinnacle Homes, Inc. v. Labor Commission, z007 UT App 368, 173 P.3d 
208, found that a contractor (statutory employer) and subcontractor were liable to pay 
the workers' compensation benefits due to a roofer that fell in the course of his 
employment. In affirming the decision of the Appeals Board, the court stated that Utah 
Code Ann. § 34A-2-401 "requires employers to provide \jvorkers' compensation benefits 
277. 
°See Workers' Compensation Fund v. Wadman C^rp., 2009 UT 18, f33, 210 P.3d 
81 Utah Code Ann. 1953 § 34A-2-401(2)(a) (2002). 
nBB & B Transportation, 893 P.2d at 614. 
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to employees injured in work-related accidents.' Utah law requires that statutory 
employers be liable for benefits to injured employees. The district court's failure to 
include Mr. Searle's statutory employer Wadman on the judgment violates the Workers' 
Compensation Act and the prior decisions of Utah courts. 
III. Whether the District Court Abused its discretion by failing to take evidence 
on the status of the relationship between Argonaut and Wadman 
The district court refused to allow Argonaut to present evidence of the contract 
and the status of the relationship between Argonaut and Wadman.84 This decision 
prevented Argonaut from presenting issues to the district court that had not yet been 
addressed in the litigation. The insurance contract between Argonaut and Wadman has 
not been put into evidence in this case. That contract is the controlling document that 
will determine what benefits Argonaut is required to pay on behalf of Wadman to its 
statutory employee Mr. Searle. It is common knowledge that insurance contracts contain 
provisions that may limit coverage of an insured. Argonaut, Wadman, and WCF must 
have the opportunity to review this contract and have a court of competent jurisdiction 
interpret its provisions. Not allowing the parties this opportunity is error. 
WCF contends, and the trial court agreed, that all terms of the contract between 
Wadman and Argonaut are contained in the OCIP Manuals in evidence, that all terms of 
the OCIP Contract are set by statute, and that there are no more issues remaining before 
**Pinnacle Homes, 2007 UT App 368 at %9. 
84R. 1451. 
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the trial court.85 These assertions are incorrect. First, the OCIP Manual was prepared by 
Willis86 and the representations of coverage in the manual were not made by Argonaut. 
Thus, those representations cannot be binding on Argonaut.87 Also, the OCIP Manual 
clearly states that it "[d]oes not and is not intended to provide coverage interpretations. 
The terms and conditions of the policies alone govern how coverage is applied."88 The 
policies that are now at issue in this case have never been put in evidence. To state that 
all terms of the contract and policies have been before the court is false. As the OCIP 
Manual states, the policy is controlling and must be interpreted by the court. 
IV. Whether the Labor Commission has exclusive jurisdiction to determine 
allowable benefits when they are in dispute and 
charged and at what rate. 
whether interest should be 
The district court erred when it entered judgment including damages because it 
does not have jurisdiction to determine workers' compensation benefits. Also, the 
interest rate charged by the court was in error because the Workers' Compensation Act 
sets the rate of interest for workers' compensation benefits. 
S5Seee.g. R. 1355-1358 and R. 1451. 
86R. 579. 
slSee CityElec. v. Dean Evans Chrysler-Plymouth, 672 P.2d 89, 90 (Utah 1983) ("It 
is the principal who must cause third parties to believe that ti(ie agent is clothed with apparent 
authority.") and Restatement (Second) of Agency § 7 (2007) (Only when principal has 
manifested consent does agent have the power to affect the legal relations of the principal). 
!R. 581. 
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A. The Labor Commission has exclusive jurisdiction to determine 
workers' compensation benefits. 
The district court lacked jurisdiction to enter a judgment that awarded workers' 
compensation benefits. Only the Labor Commission has jurisdiction to determine 
allowable benefits in workers' compensation cases. The district court even recognized 
this in its judgment.89 The Workers' Compensation Act explicitly provides that 
"[sjubject to appellate review under Section 34A-1-303, the commission has exclusive 
jurisdiction to hear and determine whether the treatment or services rendered to 
employees by physicians, surgeons, or other health providers are: (i) reasonably related 
to industrial injuries ... and (ii) compensable pursuant to this chapter ...."90 In addition, 
the Workers' Compensation Act prohibits those seeking the collection or payment of 
benefits from maintaining "a cause of action in any forum within this state other than the 
commission"91 subject to a few exceptions that are not applicable in this case. 
The district court in this case had no jurisdiction to determine the amount of 
benefits payable to Mr. Searle. "District courts have no jurisdiction whatsoever over the 
89
"Any dispute regarding the benefits provided pursuant to the Utah Workers 
Compensation Act is the [sic] exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Utah Labor 
Commission." R. 1481. 
90Utah Code Ann. 1953 § 34A-2-407(ll)(a) (2002). Mr. Searle was injured on 
February 7, 2002 and the statute cited was the statute in effect at the time of his injury. The 
current version of 34A-2-407(l l)(a) also gives the Labor Commission exclusive jurisdiction 
to determine "the reasonableness of the amounts charged or paid" and "collection issues 
related to a good or service." 
91Utah Code Ann. 1953 § 34A-2-407(l l)(b) (2002). 
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determination of the amount of a compensation award or kn award of medical 
benefits."92 The Workers' Compensation Act allows resort to a district court only if an 
employee is injured by a willful or intentional tortious act or if an employer fails to 
comply with the insurance requirements of the act.93 These exceptions are not applicable 
and the district court erred when it entered an award against Argonaut for the workers' 
compensation benefits of Mr. Searle. 
In a prior appeal, this Court stated "[b]ecause Wadjnan's policy with Argonaut 
was still valid and Mr. Searle was the statutory employee of Wadman, Argonaut must 
pay Mr. Searle's compensation benefits."94 The district court, in violation of the 
Workers' Compensation Act and Argonaut's due process rights, accepted WCF's 
unilateral determination of Mr. Searle's compensation benefits and entered judgment 
with damages against Argonaut. The Labor Commission has the exclusive jurisdiction to 
determine Mr. Searle's compensation benefits and Argonaut has the right to present 
evidence before the Labor Commission. Mr. Searle's proceeding before the Labor 
Commission has been stayed pending resolution of this ca^e.95 The district court should 
92Stokes v. Flanders, 970 P.2d 1260, 1262 (Utah 1998). See also Sheppick v. 
Albertson's, Inc., 922 P.2d 769, 773 (Utah 1996) ("District courts have no jurisdiction 
whatsoever over cases that fall within the purview of the Wqrkers' Compensation Act") and 
cases cited therein. 
93 See Sheppick, 922 P.2d at 774 and Utah Code Annl 1953 §34A-2-207. 
"Workers' Compensation Fund v. Wadman Corp., 2009 UT 18, |40, 210 P.3d277; 
R.1313. 
95 R. 709. 
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have transferred the damages portion of the judgment to the Labor Commission for 
determination instead of accepting the WCF's cursory assertions of the benefits due to 
Mr. Searle. Argonaut must be able to present its case before the Labor Commission and 
have the Labor Commission determine what medical expenses are related to the accident 
and if those medical expenses were reasonable. 
B. The District Court erred when it awarded prejudgment interest as 
provided in Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1 and postjudgment interest as 
provided in Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-4. 
The district court erred because the Workers' Compensation Act has its own 
interest provisions that apply to this case so Utah Code Ann. §§ 15-1-1 and 15-1-4 are 
inapplicable to this case. 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1 only applies between parties to a 
contract. 
The district court awarded WCF $239,421.49 in prejudgment interest based on 
Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1. However, this statute is inapplicable to this case. Utah Code 
Ann. § 15-1-1 only applies to parties to a lawful contract. There is no contract between 
Argonaut and WCF and so this statute does not apply. This Court in Wilcox v. Anchor 
Wate, Co., 2007 UT 39, 164 P.3d 353 reversed a district court judge's award of interest 
based on Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1. The Court found that "[o]nly when the parties to a 
contract fail to specify a rate of interest does the default rate specified in section 15-1-
1(2) apply."96 The Court found the district court erred because there was no contract 
Wilcox, 2007 UT 39, [^44. 
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between the parties in Wilcox and that the appropriate rat^ of interest was that provided 
by the statutes governing distribution of estates.97 
Like the parties in Wilcox, there is no contract between Argonaut and WCF that 
would trigger the applicability of Utah Code Ann. § 15-1^ 
involves statutory provisions that provide an interest rate. 
Act provides that interest of 8% per annum is payable "from the date when each benefit 
payment would have otherwise become due and payable.' 
pre-judgment interest relying on vague calculations based 
1. Also, as in Wilcox, this case 
The Workers' Compensation 
98
 The district court's award of 
on unsupported claim 
payment cash flows for calender years by WCF99 is in direct violation of this statute. 
There is no contract between Argonaut and WCF to make Utah Code Ann. § 15-
1-1 applicable to the judgment in this case. Pursuant to thd Workers' Compensation Act, 
interest can only be applied from the date when each benefit was payable. This will 
require the Labor Commission to determine what benefits 
when the benefits were and are payable. The district court 
are due to Mr. Searle and 
erred in granting prejudgment 
interest. 
97Id. 
98 Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-420(3) (2002). 
"SeeR. 1517-1518. 
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2. The Workers' Compensation Act has its own interest provision 
that is applicable to this case. 
The post-judgment interest awarded by the district court is based on Utah Code 
Ann. § 15-1-4. Like Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1, this provision is inapplicable to this case. 
This statute applies to contracts and obligations in general.100 There is no contract 
between Argonaut and WCF and Argonaut is to pay Mr. Searle's compensation benefits 
not an obligation to WCF.101 This case involves the payment of workers' compensation 
benefits and, as was established above, the Workers' Compensation Act and the Labor 
Commission should govern the amount of payments in this case. Utah Code Ann. §15-
1-4 is inapplicable and the interest rate set forth in the Workers' Compensation Act 
governs. 
Interest on workers' compensation benefits is governed by Utah Code Ann. § 
34A-2-420. This section provides that "[ajwards made by final order of the commission 
shall include interest at the rate of 8% per annum from the date when each benefit 
payment would have otherwise become due and payable."102 There has not been a final 
award entered by the Labor Commission regarding benefits due to Mr. Searle and 
therefore it was improper for the district court to enter a judgment with interest against 
Argonaut at the rate of 10%. Interest should be awarded at the rate provided by the 
mSee Utah Code Ann. § 15. 
mSee Workers' Compensation Fund v.Wadman Corp,, 2009 UT 18, f40, 210 P.3d 
277. 
102Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-420(3). 
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Workers' Compensation Act and only on a final order by |he Labor Commission. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reversb the district court's entry of 
judgment and require a hearing on damages where evidence of the policy can be 
presented or allow the Labor Commission to determine thp benefits due to Mr. Searle. 
DATED this 7~ day of July, 2010. 
ib PLANT, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL 
cm ^J^^t^v. 
Theodore E. Kartell 
Daniel E. Young 
Attorneys for Appellants 
Argonaut Insurance Company 
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ORAL ARGUMENT 
Argonaut requests oral argument be scheduled in this matter. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ~7 day of July, 2010. 
PLANT, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL 
leodore E. Kanell 
Daniel E. Young 
Attorneys for Appellants 
Argonaut Insurance Company 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERWCE 
I hereby certify that on the "T day of July, 2010, a true and correct copy of 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT ARGONAUT INSURANCE COMPANY was mailed, 
postage prepaid to the following: 
James R. Black 
James R. Black & Associates 
265 E. 100 S., Ste 255 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Dennis V. Lloyd 
Workers Compensation Fund 
100 West Towne Ridge Parkway 
Sandy, UT 84070 
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ADDENDUM 
Pursuant to Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure R i^le 24(a)(l 1)(A)-(C), Argonaut 
attaches as "Exhibit A" the district court's judgment on remand and as "Exhibit B" this 
Court's prior decision in this case. 
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Judgment on Remand 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR S^LT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND 
and IVERSON STEEL and ERECTION 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STATE of UTAH DEPARTMENT of 
ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES, 
DIVISION of RISK MANAGEMENT, 
WASHINGTON COUNTY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, WADMAN 
CORPORATION and ARGONAUT 
INSURANCE CO.. 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT ON REMAND 
FROM THE UTAH SUPREME 
COURT (Revised Per Minute Entry 
Dated December 11,2009) 
Civil No. Q20903830 
Judge: Q 4 ^ P. bf^*«* 
t(F 
020903830 
(JD30659350 pages: 41 
ARGONAUT INSURANCE 
Page 1 of 6 
PRELIMINARY 
1. This matter is subject to a Remand Order from the Utah Supreme Court dated 
March 24, 2009. 
2. Workers Compensation Fund and Iverson Steel (jointly referred to as "WCF") 
filed its First Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief1 dated September 30, 2002. Among 
other claims for relief, WCF asked the district court for the following declaratory and other relief 
from defendant Argonaut Insurance ("Argonaut"): (1) A declaratory judgment that Argonaut is 
the insurance carrier liable to pay workers compensation benefits to and on behalf of statutory 
employee Corey Searle, an Iverson Steel employee who was injured in an accident arising out of 
and in the course of his OCIP employment for statutory employer Wadman Corporation; (2) that 
Argonaut is to reimburse WCF all workers' compensation benefits it advanced on behalf of 
Corey Searle; (3) that Argonaut is to reimburse WCF administrative costs incurred in adjusting 
the Corey Searle workers' compensation claim; (4) that Argonaut be assessed interest as allowed 
by Utah law; and (5) that Argonaut pay WCF the costs of court incurred in pursuing the claim 
against Argonaut2. 
4. After discovery was completed, the parties filed cross motions for summary 
judgment. The district court granted the defendants' motions and denied WCF's. WCF 
appealed. 
5. Prior to the appeal, WCF stipulated to a dismissal with prejudice of defendant 
*See Declaratory Judgments Utah Code Ann. §78B-6-401 et seq. and Rule 57 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
2See "First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Other Relief as Attachment 1 
hereto. 
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Willis.3 
6. Prior to an appellate court ordered mediation, defendant Wadman assigned its 
rights to WCF.4 
7. Prior to oral argument before the Utah Supreme |Court, WCF stipulated to the 
dismissal with prejudice of its claims against the School Distrid and the State of Utah 
defendants. WCF's remaining claim on appeal was that the district court erred in granting 
summary judgment to Argonaut.5 
8. The Supreme Court reversed the Third District Court's decision granting 
defendant Argonaut's motion for summary judgment in its opinion dated March 24,2009. It 
ordered the case remanded "...for action consistent with... (the) opinion".6 
9. Argonaut filed a Petition for Rehearing April 7, 2009. Per Supreme Court request 
WCF filed a responsive brief May 19, 2009. The Supreme Coup denied Argonaut's rehearing 
petition June 24, 2009. 
JUDGMENT 
The Court, having reviewed the Utah Supreme Court opntuon in this matter and the 
associated remand order, hereby adopts that opinion in its entirety and specifically enters 
judgment as requested by WCF that: 
3Workers Compensation Fund v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 2009 |UT 18; 626 Utah Adv. Rep. 18; 
Utah Lexis 54 (Utah 2009). See the Supreme Court opinion h\ its entirety as Attachment 2. 
4See, Id. at |^6, Attachment 2. 
5See, Id., Attachment 2. 
6See, Id. at f41, Attachment 2. 
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1. Defendant Wadman, general contractor of the Owner Controlled Insurance 
Program ("OCIP") project, was at all relevant times the statutory employer7 of Iverson Steel and 
its OCIP site injured employee Corey Searle8; 
2. Because Wadman ys policy with Argonaut was still valid and Mr. Searle was the 
statutory employee of Wadman, Argonaut must pay Mr. Searle fs compensation benefits9; 
3. Argonaut shall reimburse WCF all workers' compensation benefits it advanced 
on behalf of Corey Searle and will immediately assume its role as the liable workers 
compensation carrier for the Corey Searle claim at issue. 
To August 10, 2009, WCF is entitled to reimbursement of $490,063.10 it has paid to or 
on behalf of Corey Searle10. 
Any dispute regarding the benefits provided pursuant to the Utah Workers Compensation 
Act is the exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Utah Labor Commission11; 
4. Argonaut shall reimburse WCF reasonable administrative costs incurred in 
adjusting the Corey Searle workers' compensation claim which totals $7,000; 
5. Argonaut shall pay prejudgment interest on all workers' compensation benefits it 
advanced on behalf of Corey Searle and reasonable administrative costs incurred in adjusting the 
7See, Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-103(7)(a)(ii). 
8See, Argonaut at [^f 39 and 40, Attachment 2. 
9See, Id. at f40, Attachment 2. 
10See the Claim Reserves Summary as Attachment 3. 
nSee, Working RX, Inc. V. Workers Compensation Fund, 2007 UT App 376; 173 P.3d 
853. Stokes v. Flanders, 970 P.2d 1260, 1262 (Utah 1998). 
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Corey Searle workers5 compensation claim as provided in Utah Code Ann. §15-1-1 at 10% per 
annum to the date of entry of this Judgment. The prejudgment (interest as of August 10, 2009, 
totals $293,421.4912. 
6. After entry this Judgment and until the Judgment is satisfied, Argonaut shall pay 
post judgment interest on all amounts herein ordered as provided by Utah Code Ann. §15-1-4. 
7. The judgment totals as follows: 
Workers Compensation Benefits paid to August 110, 2009 
Administrative Costs to August 10, 2009 
Prejudgment Interest Per Utah Code Ann. §15-Ul 
Total Judgment 
$490,063.1013 
$ 7,000.00 
$293,421.49" 
$790484.59 
Dated this 21 day o 2010 
DISTRICT COUKOUDOfi^^ 
2See, Attachment 4 with explanation of calculations and ^spreadsheet of prejudgment 
interest. 
13See the Claim Reserves summary as Attachment 3. 
14To August 10, 2009. See, Attachment 4 with explanation of calculations and 
spreadsheet of prejudgment interest. 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the 18th day of December 2009,1 caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Revised Per Minute Entry Dated December 11, 2009) 
to be DELIVERED to the following: 
Theodore E. Kanell 
PLANT, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL, PC 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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EXHIBIT B 
WCF v. Wadman, 2009 UT 1$, 210 P.3d 277 
Westtsw 
Page 1 
210 P 3d 277, 626 Utah Adv Rep 18, 2009 UT 18 
(Cite as: 210 P.3d 277) 
H 
Supreme Court of Utah 
WORKERS* COMPENSATION FUND and Iverson Steel and ErectioJi Company, Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v 
WADMAN CORPORATION, Defendant and Appellant, 
v 
State of Utah Depaitment of Administrative Services, Division of Risk Management, Argonaut Insuiance Co , and 
Washington County School District, Defendants ^nd Appellee 
Nos. 20070160, 20070180. 
March 24, 2009 
Rehearing Denied June 24, 2009 
Background: Workers' Compensation Fund (WCF) brought action aganist general contractor and its Workers' 
Compensation insurer after coverage was denied to employee of subcontractor injured on project overseen by general 
contractor The District Court, Third District, Salt Lake County, Saruha N ffeulei, J , gi anted summary judgment to 
msurei, and WCF appealed 
Holdings: The Supreme Comt, Nehnng, J , held that 
11) insurer was not bound by acts of general contractor which had agreed to have subconti actor's employees covered, 
{2j employees of subcontractor were not covered as "loaned employees" of general contractor, 
(">) manual of Owner Controlled Insurance Program (OCIP) did not mandate that OCPI must automatically supply 
insurance to all subcontractor, 
ij-) injured employee of subcontractor was not coveied as employee of subconti actor, 
(5) insurer did not have responsibility to verify that subcontractors were properly enrolled, and 
H>) general contractor was statutory employer of subcontractor and its employees were coveied by contractor's cov-
eiage 
Reversed 
i l l Workers' Compensation 413 € ^ 1 1 
West Headnotes 
413 Workers' Compensation 
4 PI Nature and Grounds of Employer's Liability 
413k 11 k Purpose of Legislation Most Cited Cases 
The purpose of the Workeis' Compensation Act is to provide compensation! to injured employees by a simple and 
speedy piocedure which eliminates the expense, delay and uncertainty in proving fault West's L C A ^ 4 \ 2 101 to 
JH Workers' Compensation 413 €^>1061 
413 Woikers' Compensation 
4 n \ I Insurance and Public Funds 
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413X1{D) Private Insurance 
413k1061 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
When a dispute arises regarding workers' compensation insurance, inferences constituting a worker's right to recover 
are liberally construed in favor of the employee. West's U.C.A. § 34A-2-101 to § 34A-11-102. 
]31 Workers' Compensation 413 €^>1061 
443 Workers' Compensation 
413X1 Insurance and Public Funds 
\\3XhD} Private Insurance 
413k1Q6l k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
Workers' Compensation insurer was not bound by acts of general contractor, which had agreed to have subcontractor's 
employees covered but then neglected to send enrollment form to insurer's broker, although contractor may have acted 
as if it had authority to complete the enrollment process; insurer had not contributed to formation of a belief that 
contractor was its agent or knowingly permitted it to assume the exercise of such authority and, to contrary, contractor 
had agreement with broker to act as its agent to receive insurance enrollment forms. 
HI Principal and Agent 308 € ^ 9 9 
}08 Principal and Agent 
3081 fl Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons 
30SIIKA) Powers of Agent 
308k98 Implied and Apparent Authority 
20Sk99 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
It is only when consent to the exercise of authority by a presumptive agent has been manifested by the principal that 
the agent has the power to affect the legal relations of the principal. RcstaicmentJ Second] of A^ene\ _§.7-
{51 Workers' Compensation 413 € ^ 1 0 6 5 
413 Workers' Compensation 
4 {3X4 Insurance and Public Funds 
iLlXLlPJ Private Insurance 
413kJ 064 Risks and Coverage 
4JL3kJ06S k. In General. Mo&t Cited Cases 
Employees of a subcontractor which was inadvertently left out of applications for Workers' Compensation coverage 
were not covered as "loaned employees" of general contractor under alternate employer endorsement of general 
contractor's policy with insurer; subcontractor's employees were not on contractor's payroll or meant to continue 
working for contractor after the project was completed, and subcontractor had contracted with contractor as a com-
pany to perform work, not contracted as employees. 
J61 Workers' Compensation 413 € ^ 1 0 6 1 
413 Workers' Compensation 
4J3X1 Insurance and Public Funds 
413X1(D) Private Insurance 
413kl06l k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
Manual of Owner Controlled Insurance Program (OCIP) did not mandate that "OOP team" of the state, its engineer, 
and all applicable insurance carriers or state agency representatives working to implement the insurance program must 
automatically supply insurance to all subcontractors, such that a subcontractor would be covered despite general 
contractor's neglect to send form to insurer's broker; manual instead required that subcontractors and contractors must 
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submit enrollment forms and obtain separate insurance contracts. 
121 Insurance 217 €^>2094 
21.7 Insurance 
217XV Coverage—in General 
217k2094 k. Commencement of Coverage. Most Cited Cases 
When determining the starting date of an insurance contract, the law looks to| the contract terms. 
18] Workers' Compensation 413 € ^ 1 0 6 5 
413 Workers' Compensation 
413X1 Insurance and Public Funds 
413X1(1)) Private Insurance 
413k 1064 Risks and Coverage 
413kl065 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
Injured employee of subcontractor on public project, for whom general contractor neglected to send Workers' Com-
pensation enrollment form to insurer's broker, was not covered by insurer as employee of subcontractor; Owner 
Controlled Insurance Program (OCIP) manual plainly stated that the form mijst be submitted as part of the enrollment 
process, and the insurance company never issued a binding receipt. 
121 Workers' Compensation 413 € ^ 1 0 6 1 
413 Workers' Compensation 
413X1 Insurance and Public Funds 
43 3XI(D) Private Insurance 
413k 1061 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
Workers' Compensation insurer on a public construction project did not halve responsibility to verify that subcon-
tractors were properly enrolled for Workers' Compensation coverage as part of its contract with the Owner Controlled 
Insurance Program (OCIP); duty of OCIP team members was to oversee safety, not relieve contractors of responsi-
bility, and OCIP manual specified that general contractor itself had responsibility to ensure that subcontractors were 
enrolled. West's U.C.A. § 34A-2-201. 
[10] Workers' Compensation 413 €^>351 
4JL3 Workers' Compensation 
413 V Employees Within Acts 
413V(G) Employees of Contractor or Subcontractor 
413k351 k. Liability of General Contractor to Employees of Subcontractor. Most Cited Cases 
General contractor on public construction project was statutory employer, under Workers' Compensation statutes, of 
subcontractor and its employees for whom general contractor had neglected to file form for Workers' Compensation 
coverage, and thus employees were covered by contractor's insurance; contractor hired subcontractor to complete steel 
work and therefore procured its services, contractor exercised control by supervising subcontractor's work, and con-
tractor's trade and business was construction, so that erecting steel in the building was part of that trade and business. 
West's U.C.A. §34A-2-103(2). 
1111 Workers' Compensation 413 ^ ^ 3 ^ 
413 Workers' Compensation 
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4J 1X_ Employees Within Acts 
^ LlYlLll Employees of Contractor or Subcontractor 
41 ">kJ44 k In General Most C ited Cases 
Typically, an employee seeking Workers' Compensation coverage for an injury cannot reach through the layers of 
employers any further than the first-msured contractor West's I ' C A § 34A-2-1 (J3.(7)(e) 
*279 James R Black, Dennis V Lloyd, Salt Lake City, for appellant Workers' Compensation Fund 
iheodoie F Kanell, Russell \\ Haitvigsen, Salt Lake City, for appellee 
NLHRIN< i. Justice 
INTRODUCTION 
Tf 1 In this appeal, we determine who was responsible foi paying workers' compensation benefits to Corey Searle, an 
employee of Iverson Steel and Erection Company, who was injured while working on the Santa Clara Middle School 
m Santa Clara, Utah Iverson had a subcontract with Wadman Corporation to peiform the steel erection component of 
the construction of the Santa Clara Middle School, Wadman was the entity retained by the Washington County School 
District to be the general contractor on the project Argonaut Insurance Company provided the workers' compensation 
coverage for the project through an Owner-Controlled Insurance Program, which we will refer to as the OCIP After 
Mr Searle was injured, Argonaut refused to pay his claims The Workers' Compensation Fund x l then sued the 
Washington County School District, the State of Utah Department of Administrative Services, Division of Risk 
Management, Willis of Utah, Inc , Wadman, and Argonaut The WCF stipulated to a dismissal of its claim against 
Willis The School District, the Division of Risk Management, and Argonaut successfully moved for summary 
judgment The WCF appealed It claims that the district court erred when it concluded that the defendants were not 
responsible for providing coverage to Iverson that covered Mr Seaile After the appeal was filed but before oral 
argument, the WCF settled with the School District and the Division of Risk Management, leaving only the WCF's 
claim against Argonaut to be decided As we conclude that Mr Searle was Wadman's statutory employee, we reveise 
1_N_L Iverson was initially a plaintiff in this case, but it subsequently assigned its rights to the WCF 
BACKGROUND 
% 2 While working on the Middle School project for the School Distuct, Mr Seaile seveiely injured both legs when he 
fell two stones and landed on concrete Insurance coveiage foi the Middle School pioject was controlled by the OCIP, 
which was initially created by the Division of Risk Management After the OOP's creation, each school district withm 
Utah had the option of participating m the OCIP to help reduce construction costs The School District chose to par-
ticipate in the OCIP for the Middle School project Argonaut was the designated workers' compensation insurance 
carrier for all contractois and subcontractors who enrolled m the OCIP As part of its contract with the School District, 
Wadman agreed to purchase workers' compensation insurance through the *280 OCIP Wadman also agreed to be 
responsible for ensuring that all subcontractors were enrolled with the OCIP carrier, Argonaut 
K 3 Although Wadman initially verified that all subcontractors were properly enrolled in the OCIP, the steel erection 
subcontractor originally retained by Wadman fell behind schedule and Wadman replaced it with a new subcontractor, 
Iverson, to complete the steel erection work Wadman rejected Iverson's initial bid for the work, but an agreement was 
reached after Iverson reduced its price to pass through to Wadman the savings in workeis' compensation piemiums 
that Iverson would realize because of the OCIP After Iverson agreed to the contract, Wadman trained Iverson in the 
safety practices required by the OCIP, but it failed to send the OCIP enrollment form for Iverson to Willis, the m-
suiance broker that was assigned to be the OCIP administrator Iverson began working on the project on January 28, 
2002, and Argonaut began receiving insurance premiums for the job The WCF, Iverson's alternate insurance provider, 
did not receive premiums foi the Middle School project Argonaut's Senior Safety Management Consultant, J Le-
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manski, later inspected the construction site for safety, but he did not comment on Iverson's enrollment status On 
February 7, 2002, Mr Searle was mjured The following day, Wadman submitted the enrollment form for Iverson to 
Willis Argonaut later issued Iverson an insurance policy, but the effective date of the policy was February 8, the day 
after the accident 
^ 4 Iverson submitted a claim for Mr Searle's injury to Argonaut, which Argonaut denied Argonaut based its denial 
on the fact that the enrollment form was not submitted until the day after Mr Searle's accident The WCF then sued 
Argonaut, the Division of Risk Management, the School District, Willis, and Wadman The defendants moved to 
dismiss First, they contended that the WCF did not have standing to bring its claim because it was not injured The 
WCF successfully overcame the challenge to its standing by noting that it had obtained an assignment of rights from 
Iverson and had paid Mr Searle's claim 
f 5 Following discovery, the WCF stipulated to a dismissal of its claims agaWt Willis The School District and the 
Division of Risk Management moved for summary judgment They asserted that they could not be considered the 
employers or insurers of Iverson because no contractual obligation existed that required them to pay workers' com-
pensation Argonaut also moved for summary judgment, arguing that it did jnot have a responsibility to provide in-
surance for Mr Searle because Wadman did not have agency authority to act 
not loaned, the enrollment form foi Iverson was not submitted until after the 
for Argonaut, Iverson's employees were 
accident, and Wadman was not the sta-
tutory employer of Mr Searle Wadman opposed the other defendants' motions for summary judgment and amended 
its answer to include cross-claims against Argonaut, the School District, and the Division of Risk Management The 
district court held a hearing on all the motions before it and granted summary judgment m favor of the School District, 
the Division of Risk Management, and Argonaut It also held that the grant of summary judgment to those defendants 
made Wadman's cross-claims moot 
U 6 The WCF appealed Wadman filed a separate appeal The cases were assigned together for mediation On Sep-
tember 7, 2007, prior to the mediation, Wadman assigned its rights to the WCF Mediation between the WCF, the 
School District, the Department of Risk Management, and Argonaut was not successful A briefing schedule was set, 
and the WCF timely filed a brief in which it advanced the claims of Iverson and Wadman that had been assigned to it 
The WCF argued that the district court's grant of summary judgment to Argonaut, the School District, and the Division 
of Risk Management was in error Prior to oral argument, the WCF stipulated to the dismissal with prejudice of its 
claims against the School District and the Division of Risk Management The WCF's only remaining claim on appeal 
is, therefoie, that the district court erred m granting summary judgment to Argonaut The WCF advances the following 
arguments foi requiring Argonaut to provide coverage for Mr Searle's accident (1) Wadman was Argonaut's agent 
and bound Aigonaut*281 to provide coverage, (2) Iverson's employees were loaned employees and were covered by 
the Alternate Employer Endorsement of the Argonaut Policy, (3) Argonaut must provide coverage because the Middle 
School was an OCIP pioject and Argonaut was an OCIP insurer, and (4) Argonaut must provide coverage because 
Wadman was the statutory employer of Mr Searle and because Argonaut wasj bound to cover workers' compensation 
claims against Wadman 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
f 7 In order for summary judgment to be granted, there must be no issue of material fact and the moving party must be 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law ! tah R Ci\ P So(c), Bouen \ RnatbnLm 6S6P 2d 4^4 4 ^ <[ lah 1982) 
The essential facts of the case legardmg the terms and manner of Mr Searle's employment are undisputed As a result, 
the responsibility of Argonaut to pay compensation for Mr Searle's accident is an issue of law that we will decide 
Bennett \ Indus ( omm n "26 P 2d 42?. 429 (Utah 1986), lUmc heath Sdf\\d\ bred Pwih hit 304 Md 6~\ 49^ 
\ 2d 803, 806 (1%^) The court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to t rlah C ode section "8 VMQ2(3)(j) and 
gives no deference to the district court's conclusions of law, Kianlz i Holt, 819 P 2d 352 "^3 (I lah 1991) 
ANALYSIS 
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[l][2j ^ 8 The purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act is to provide compensation to injured employees "by a 
simple and speedy procedure which eliminates the expense, delay and uncertainty" in proving fault. IVi I steady Indus, 
Comm'n, 17 Utah 2d 214, 4Q7 P,2d 692, 693 (1965); see Shupe v Wasatth Elee. Co . 546 P.2d 896. 900 fl tali 1976) 
(Maughan, J., dissenting). When a dispute arises regarding workers' compensation insurance, "inferences ... consti-
tuting a worker's right to recover are liberally construed" in favor of the employee. Baker v. Indus Comm'n. 17 Utah 
Z&JA L 405 P.2d6l3. 614 (Utah 1965). The WCF argues that various doctrines have been created to afford employees 
compensation and to prevent employers from avoiding responsibility. Specifically, it argues that Argonaut should 
have been required to provide coverage based on the theory of agency authority, the loaned employee doctrine, the 
requirement that insurance contracts be interpreted in favor of the employee, and the statutory employer doctrine. We 
will discuss each of these theories in turn, concluding that despite shortcomings of the first three, Mr. Searle was the 
statutory employee of Wadman and therefore covered by its compensation earner, Argonaut. 
I. WADMAN DID NOT HAVE AGENCY AUTHORITY TO ACT FOR ARGONAUT 
[3J H 9 The WCF claims that Wadman acted as Argonaut's agent, which obligated Argonaut to provide insurance. The 
argument presented is that a principal, Argonaut, is bound by the acts of an agent who has apparent authority to act. 
The WCF and Iverson contend that since Wadman acted as if it had authority to complete the workers' compensation 
enrollment process, Argonaut was bound by Wadman's actions. See Restatement (Second) of Xgency § 8 (1958); 
Vickenx. N._±m Land Devs , lnc . 94 N.M. 65, 607 P.2d 603, 604 (1980). 
[4] \10 We indicated in Litddmgton v Bodenvest, Ltd that in order to cloak a presumptive agent with authority, " 'the 
principal [must have] manifested his ... consent to the exercise of such authority or [have] knowingly permitted the 
agent to assume the exercise of such authority.' " 855 P.2d 204, 209 (Utah 1993) (quoting Am.iur.2d Agency $ 80 
(1986)). We also stated that "[i]t is the principal who must cause third parties to believe that the agent is clothed with 
apparent authority." (7/v Elei, v Dean Evans Chrysler-Plymouth. (C>2 P.2d 89, 90 (Utah 198^). It is only when this 
consent has been manifested by the principal that the agent has "the power to affect the legal relations of the principal." 
fe^tateme\\\ (Second) of Agency § 7 (2007). 
TJ 11 The WCF and Iverson argue that Wadman's actions imply that agency authority existed. The record, however, 
contains no evidence that Argonaut contributed to the *282 formation of a belief that Wadman was Argonaut's agent 
or that Argonaut knowingly permitted Wadman to "assume the exercise of such authority." Lunjljiigion „85_5_P2d_ai 
209. Argonaut contracted with Willis to act as its agent, with the authority to receive all enrollment forms and issue 
safety manuals. The limit of Wadman's workers' compensation responsibility was to verify that subcontractors were 
properly enrolled in the OCIP as required by Wadman's contract with the School District. 
K 12 If Iverson believed that an agency relationship existed between Wadman and Argonaut, it was Iverson's re-
sponsibility to verify that Argonaut had conferred this authority on Wadman. lions hirst Aat'l Bank v Clark Clam 
Ci}I'lhj.2:ilZJLld iPlU,.109_5.xU.iah 1988) (holding that "one who deals exclusively with an agent has the responsibility 
to ascertain that agent's authority despite the agent's representations"). Since Iverson did not verify that Wadman had 
agency authority and since Argonaut never stated that such an authority existed, Wadman could not have acted to bind 
Argonaut as Iverson's workers' compensation insurer. 
II. IVERSON'S EMPLOYEES WERE NOT "LOANED" EMPLOYEES 
[5J K 13 The WCF also contends that Iverson's employees were "loaned" to Iverson by Wadman and consequently 
were covered by the Alternate Employer Endorsement of Argonaut's workers' compensation policy with Wadman 
The WCF failed to state what was meant by a "loaned employee" in its brief and did not explain or include the full text 
or background of the Alternate Employer Endorsement. Consequently, the substance of its argument is unclear. We 
assume, however, that the WCF was referring to the rule set forth in 07/crs? v Salazar, 883 P.2d 1352, 1356-5 7 (Utah 
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1994) Ghei si indicates that an employee is loaned if " '(a) the employee [has made a contract of hire, express or 
implied, with the special employer, (b) the work being done is essentially that of the special employer, and (c) the 
special employer has the right to control the details of the work ' " Id_ (quoting IB Arthur Larson, Workmen's Com 
pensation Law § 48 00, at 8-343 (1992)) The loaned employee doctrine typically applies when a temporary agency or 
general employer hires employees, placing them on company payroll, and then loans the employees to other "special" 
employers to actually perform work Id 
U 14 The WCF's argument regarding how Iverson's employees were loaned is ambiguous The WCF does claim, 
however, that Iverson was Wadman's special or alternate employer and should therefore receive compensation from 
Wadman's insurance provider, Argonaut It appears that the WCF contends thit Wadman hired Iverson's employees as 
the "general employer" and then loaned the employees back to Iverson as the temporary or "special employer," which 
obligated Argonaut, as Wadman's insurance provider, to supply coverage und^r the Alternate Employer Endorsement 
H 15 The loaned employee doctrine presupposes that workers are "under contract to the [general labor] service to work 
as an employee for a client" and that the general employer, which is typically the temporary agency but m this instance 
would be Wadman, is merely loaning the employees and not supervising the actual work Ghctw ^1_P 2dju jJW) ">" 
see also llj }(hL Wotoiola, hie B D \ri7 M 7 , 662 P 2d 1024 1025 (1983) Mere Iverson's employees did not have a 
i ontract with Wadman and no evidence was presented that Iverson's employees were on Wadman's payroll or would 
continue working for Wadman after the project was complete The inclusion of employees on the company payroll and 
their continued employment with the general employer after the completion of the project are key factors m deter-
mining if an employee is loaned See Ghasi, 88^ P 2d at 13^6 S"7 Iverson contracted with Wadman as a company to 
perform work on the project Since no contract existed between Wadman and the employees, as evidenced by the fact 
that the employees were not directly paid by Wadman, Wadman could not have loaned the employees to other entities 
Furthermore, Wadman was responsible for supervising Iverson's work, so a lpaned-employee relationship could not 
have existed 
*283 11 16 The alternate argument that Iverson loaned its employees to Wadman as the special employer also does not 
apply m this case A central test m determining if a labor service loaned its employee is if it "was not responsible for 
performance of the construction work " Wotd 662 P 2d at 102** (emphasis added) Iverson was responsible for the 
steel construction work, therefore, it did more than furnish laborers Because Iverson provided laboreis, contracted to 
erect the steel on the project, and took responsibility for the performance of the steel work, it could not have loaned its 
employees to Wadman Since no evidence was presented that Argonaut had a contract with Iverson to piovide 
workers' compensation coverage for its loaned employees, the designation of Ivjerson's employees as "loaned"-and it is 
clear that they were not "loaned"-is of no legal consequence 
III NO CONTRACT WAS CREATED BETWEEN IVERSON AND ARGCJNAUT IN THE ABSENCE OF THE 
COMPLETED ENROLLMENT FORM 
1) 17 The WCF argues that a contract of insurance was formed between Argonaiit and the state to provide coverage for 
I\ erson since Aigonaut was part of the "OOP team" and was required to provide insurance to all subcontractors The 
WCF fuithei contends that the failure to submit the emollment form was immaterial to the formation of a contract of 
msuiance between Iverson and Argonaut and therefore the contract should be enforced 
H 18 The notion that an implied contract existed between Argonaut and other participants m the OCIP team that re-
quired Argonaut to provide insurance to all subcontractors is not supported by the terms found m the OCIP manual 
The OCIP manual supplemented the individual insurance policies issued to contractors and subcontractors and set 
forth the terms of the OCIP The manual states that it "identifies, defines, andl assigns responsibilities lelated to the 
administration of the [OCIP] " It also "[describes the OCIP and details the insurance-related responsibilities of the 
various parties involved," however, it "is not intended to piovide coverage interpretations" and the "terms and con 
ditions of the policies alone govern how coverage is applied " 
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U 19 Although the policy alone determines coverage, the OCIP manual was nevertheless an essential element m de-
fining the contractual relationships that existed between the OCIP team members The manual specifies that its terms 
are binding and "[t]he requirements of the [OCIP] Manual, including State of Utah OCIP Safety and Health Manual, 
shall become a part of [the] Contract Agreement" It also states that any "Contractor/Subcontractor shall cause all 
provisions and requirements of the OCIP to be included m any contract/subcontract agreement and shall assure 
compliance " 
[6J H 20 As a binding agreement defining the contractual obligation among its parties, the OCIP manual mentions the 
existence of an "OCIP team," but does not require that the team supply insurance to all subcontractors The safety 
manual defines the OCIP team as "the Owner (STATE OF UTAH/ENGINEER), WILLIS CORROON and all ap-
plicable insurance carriers or the representative of defmed State agencies and firms working together to implement the 
insurance progiam " The manual specifies that the owner's responsibility consists of providing general support for the 
worksite The OCIP manual specifically contemplates the possibility that a contractor may choose not to enroll with 
the OCIP insurance provider The manual specifies that "[non-enrolled] contractors should notify their own insurance 
company" instead of the OCIP insurance of mjunes The OCIP manual also repeatedly states that although all sub-
contractors should enroll m OCIP, coverage is only valid for properly enrolled subcontractors, stating that '[t]he OCIP 
will be only for the benefit of Contractor/Subcontractor(s) of all tiers who have been properly enrolled m the OCIP 
progiam " In order to be properly enrolled, the manual specifies that all contractors/subcontractors are required to 
submit enrollment forms and complete certain requirements Each subcontractor also received a separate contract of 
insurance The necessity of each subcontractor obtaining a separate contract of insurance and eniollmg separately *2 84 
in the OCIP indicates no general contract of insurance existed between Argonaut and all subcontractors 
J\ % 21 In the absence of a contract being formed by the existence of the OCIP, the question remains if a contract was 
otherwise created between Iverson and Argonaut When determining the starting date of an insurance contract, the law 
looks to the contract terms Ustm Wjongfige, lnc__ \SuhL *w Tuk Ins Jo 2006 I1 F B4 *1 K 139 P 3d 10*b ("An 
msmance policy is merely a contract between the insured and the insurer and is construed pursuant to the same rules 
applied to ordinary contiacts " (internal quotation maiks omitted)) 
11 22 The Argonaut enrollment expressly states that before any contractors or subcontiactors start woik on the project, 
Willis must leceive the form The OCIP manual confirms this requirement and indicates that although u[t]he 'Start 
Date' indicated on the contract award form is the date that the Contractor/Subcontractor is expected to begin opera-
tions at the Project Site," all subcontractors aie to be properly enrolled before access to the project site is allowed and 
coveiage begins 
U 23 The WCF argues that the form was not an essential element of the contract It cites testimony from Argonaut's 
vice president from a different case m which he opined that if the State of Utah lolling wrap-up pieces were all m 
place, Argonaut would provide coveiage even without the form This statement, however, does not mean that the 
enrollment form, despite being expressly made a part of the insurance contract, is superfluous Rather, the testimony 
illustiates that m one instance, an Argonaut executive speculated that the form may not have been necessary In con-
trast to that statement, the OCIP manual repeatedly states that submitting the form is required to complete OCIP 
enrollment and that the form must be received by Willis before any subcontractors can start work The form is ne-
cessary because it allows the insurance agent to track applications for enrollment and obtain necessary information for 
setting insurance rates 
U 24 The WCF maintains that Wadman's payment of a premium for Iverson's coverage to Argonaut and not the WCF 
demonstiates that the form was a mere technicality and that a contract of insurance already existed between Argonaut 
and Iverson The WCF and Iveison fail to cite any case law supporting this assertion Several states, including Utah, 
have tieated as enforceable "binder" agreements between an msmance piovider and an insured that provide tempoiary 
msmance befoie the actual policy is issued See Williams \ hu\t Colony Lih ln\ C o , *>93 P 2d s34 ([ tali 19^9) 
These binder agreements, however, typically require an application to be submitted and the insurer to provide a con-
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ditional receipt specifying the terms of the binder. Cain v Aetna Life ins. Co 
Spimea * -Mistare Life In,. Co. of \ ) , 94 N.Y.2d 645, 710 N.V.~S.2d 29$. 
135 Kin. 189._659_P2<1J3341!%31; 
T3I N.h.2d 1106 (2000). The binder 
agreements also require, according to the Fifth Circuit, that all conditions specified by the insurance provider be met, 
Giadnex v Pau( Revere Life Ins. ( o , 895 F,2d 238 (5th Cu. 1990), "in order for a contract of temporary insurance to 
exist" ~Fox\] Catholic KJiights Im Soc'y, 2003 Wi 87, <[ 23, 263 Wis.2d 2(37 665 N.W.2d 181 (2003) (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted). Although premiums were paid to Argonaut, none of the other requirements for a 
binder agreement were met. 
^[25 We previously stated that although "it is unfair for an insurer to collect a premium which purports to cover a 
period when in fact no such coverage exists: i.e., between the time of the application and the delivery of the policy," it 
is for 
this reason, we have approved the rule that ordinarily, when the insured has done everything required of him and 
paid his premium, the insurance takes effect from the time of the issuance of a binding receipt, even though the 
policy has not been delivered. This is especially so when death or injury ocjeurs from some cause unrelated to any 
possible ground for rejecting the application. 
Williams, 593 P 2d at : 
[8J % 26 In this case, the application or enrollment form was never received by Argonaut*285 and the insurance 
company never issued a binding receipt. Argonaut clearly stated that receipt of the enrollment form was a prerequisite 
to coverage. Since Iverson was required to submit the form and no binding receipt was given, no contract was created. 
The terms of the OCIP manual were clear. The manual plainly stated that the| form must be submitted as part of the 
enrollment process. 
[9J % 27 The WCF alternately argues that Argonaut was required to provide coverage since it had a responsibility to 
verify that all subcontractors were properly enrolled as part of its contract with the OCIP. It contends that J. Lemanski, 
Argonaut's Senior Safety Management Consultant, was on the job inspecting the premises for safety before the ac-
cident, had knowledge of Iverson's involvement, and had a responsibility to vepfy that those working on the site were 
insured as part of the safety inspections. 
[^ 28 Evaluating the safety of a job site is not the same as verifying that a subcontractor has met all of the conditions 
necessary to commence insurance coverage. The OCIP Safety and Health Marjual states, "Each Contractor shall bear 
sole and exclusive responsibility for safety in all phases of their work. Nothing contained herein shall relieve such 
responsibility." It also states that the role of OCIP team members includes the 'overall management responsibility for 
site safety and health," but "[tjhis responsibility does not supersede, override! or take precedence over that of Con-
tractors who are ultimately responsible for the safety and health of their employees...." The duty of OCIP team 
members was to oversee safety, not to relieve contractors of responsibility. There is nothing m the OCIP manual that 
indicates Argonaut contracted with the Division of Risk Management to be responsible for ensuring that all subcon-
tractors were properly enrolled. In contrast, the OCIP manual clearly specifies that Wadman had a lesponsibility to 
ensure that all subcontractors were properly enrolled, and pursuant to \ hah Code section 34A-2-201, Iverson also had 
the responsibility of making sure that its employees were insured, which it failed to do. Although Argonaut may have 
had a responsibility to conduct safety inspections, verification that Iverson was properly enrolled was beyond the 
scope of Argonaut's responsibility. 
IV. MR. SEARLE WAS A STATUTORY EMPLOYEE|OF WADMAN 
Tl 29 In response to motions for summary judgment in the district court, the 
Wadman were Mr. Searle's statutory employers for purposes of workers' compensation 
those arguments here, urging us to find that under the OCIP "common law 
pjlaintiffs contended that Argonaut and 
coverage. The WCF reiterates 
employee/employer relationships are 
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altered" and the key element in determining a statutory relationship is the right to control. 
^ 30 Argonaut asserts that the statutory employer argument should be dismissed because the argument is a claim that 
could only be brought by Wadman and because Wadman failed to file an appellate brief. It is true that Wadman did not 
file an appellate brief; Wadman, however, assigned its rights to the WCF prior to the mediation and before a briefing 
schedule was set. Accordingly, the WCF had the right to bring a claim directly against Argonaut for coverage based on 
any claim that Wadman had. The WCF did so on February 7, 2008, when it filed its opening brief in which it asserted 
that Wadman was Mr. Searle's statutory employer and coverage should be provided by Argonaut. Argonaut also 
argues that the brief filed by the WCF does not raise any of Wadman's claims. Although the WCF's brief does not 
discuss the elements of the statutory employer doctrine in great detail, it does claim that Wadman was the statutory 
employer of Iverson, which was sufficient to put Argonaut on notice of the statutory employer argument. Since 
Wadman assigned its rights to the WCF and since the joint brief raised Wadman's claims, the WCF's statutory em-
ployer claim should not be dismissed. 
[10] % 31 Ltah Code section 34A-2-103(2) defines the circumstances under which an employer/employee relationship 
is created as a matter of law. This section states that an employer is someone "who regularly employs *286 one or 
more workers or operatives in the same business, or in or about the same establishment." Utah Code \nn. § 
34 A-2-103(2) (Supp. 2008) IX2. Section 34A-2-103(7)(a)(ii), the statutory employee section, also indicates that if 
FN2. The legislature amended Title 34 in 2008. Because the changes do not affect our analysis, we cite to the 
2008 version. 
an employer procures any work to be done wholly or m part for the employer by a contractor over whose work the 
employer retains supervision or control, and this work is apart or process in the trade or business of the employer, 
the contractor, all persons employed by the contractor, all subcontractors under the contractor, and all persons 
employed by any of these subcontractors, are considered employees of the original employer for the purposes of this 
chapter. 
LtaM qd_e Ann fr 34A-2-103(7)(a)(ii) (emphasis added). In Bennett v Industrial Commission, we clarified that the 
term "supervision or control" includes the general contractor's ultimate control over the project. 726 P.2d 427, 4*2 
(Utah 1986); see also Pinnacle Homes, Inc. v. Labor Comm'n. 2007 I ' 1 App 368, *.21. 173 P.3d 20S. 
K 32 In general, Argonaut cannot be described as a statutory employer merely because it participated in the OCIP. In 
order for a statutory employer relationship to exist, the employer must procure the work to be done, retain supervision 
and control, and the work must be part of the employer's trade or business. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-lU3(7)(a)(n). 
Argonaut was not the statutory employer of Iverson in this case because Argonaut did not procure the services of 
Iverson, did not have ultimate control over Iverson's work, and was not in the trade or business of construction. 
f 33 In contrast, the WCF correctly contended that Wadman was Iverson's statutory employer. Wadman hired Iverson 
to complete the steel work and therefore procured Iverson's services. Wadman also exercised control over the project 
by supervising Iverson's work. Finally, Wadman's line of trade and business was construction, and thus erecting the 
steel part of the building was part of its trade and business. Because Wadman satisfies all the elements in section 
34A-2:H)3(7)(a)(ii), it is the statutory employer of Mr. Searle. 
1] 34 Even if the level of supervision exercised by Wadman was uncertain, an inference of supervision would still 
automatically arise because the work being performed was part of the employer's business. Benm it, ^ 26 P.2d at 432. 
In Beniielj, we determined that even though general contractors frequently delegate a substantial amount of work to 
subcontractors, the general contractor remains responsible so long as the subcontractor's work is a part or process of 
the general contractor's business. [c[_ In this case, the steel construction performed by Iverson was part of Wadman's 
general business of construction and an inference of control arose because Wadman was the general contractor. 
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T| 35 Argonaut claims that Iverson already had coverage through the WCF arid therefore the statutory employer doc-
trine did not apply Argonaut also contends that the WCF, having paid Mr Searle's claim, had the right to seek 
reimbursement of unpaid premiums from Iverson, and therefore Iverson had 
counters these arguments, stating that the insurance coverage Iverson received 
School project and that Argonaut, not the WCF, received premiums for the Middle School project 
coverage through the WCF The WCF 
from the WCF did not cover the Middle 
l\ h % 36 Typically, an employee cannot reach through the layers of employers 
contractor Jmobsai x Indus Commn. ^38 P 2d 6:>S 661 (Utah Ct \pp 198 
the statutory employer doctrine is applicable to contractors and subcontractors 
woik to be done by the contractor or subcontractor obtains and relies on a 
subcontractor's compliance with Section 34A-2-201 " Section 34A-2-201 provides 
any further than the first-insured 
7
* Section 34A 2 J0i(7)(e) states that 
unless "the employer who procures 
valid certification of the contractor's or 
*287 An employer shall secure the payment of workers' compensation benefits 
(1) insuring, and keeping insured, the payment of this compensation with th|i 
for its employees by 
e Workers' Compensation Fund, 
(2) insuring, and keeping insured, the payment of this compensation with 
tion authorized to transact the business of workers' compensation insurance 
(3) obtaining approval from the division m accordance with Section 34A-2 
self-insured employei m amount, in the manner, and when due as provided 
atiy stock corporation or mutual associa-
m this state, or 
201 5 to pay direct compensation as a 
for [by statute] 
K 37 Iverson did not provide Wadman with a certificate of compliance with self ion 34 \ 2 201 for the Middle School 
project It could not have because it informed the WCF that Iverson's employees working on the Middle School project 
would not need to be covered by the WCF while they were working on the project 
1[ 38 Iverson did, however, provide some documentation of the WCF coverage to Wadman Under the OCIP, all 
subcontractors and contractors were required to provide proof of 34A-2-201 compliance for off-site activities m order 
to enroll in the OCIP Iverson had to demonstrate compliance with the off-site insurance requirement by showing that 
it had coveiage through the WCF for off-site jobs, which it did This coverage did not preclude Iverson from being a 
statutory employee for the Middle School project since Wadman never received information that Iverson had other 
insurance for the project Utah Code \nn § 34A-2 10^(7)(e) To the contrary, Wadman requested that Iverson reduce 
its bid m anticipation of the OCIP, not Iverson's usual insurance covering all work-related incidents on-site, and paid 
the premium for Iverson to be coveied under the OCIP Wadman informed Iverson that insurance would be provided, 
and Iverson acted upon this belief In this case, Wadman did not rely on a certificate of insurance from Iverson, and 
therefore the statutory employer doctrine applies 
K 39 As for Argonaut's argument that Iverson actually had coverage through the 
Mr Searle's claim and could then seek reimbursement from Iverson for unpaid 
merit If Argonaut's position was the law, employers that failed to enroll subcontractors 
escape statutory employer liability if the WCF chose to voluntarily pay injured 
lowed to avoid responsibility as the statutory employer of Iverson Because Wadman 
retained supervision and control over Iverson's work and because Iverson's work 
we hold that Wadman was the statutory employer of Iverson and theiefore the 
WCF because the WCF chose to pay 
premiums, we find that it is without 
m the OCIP could presumably 
workers Wadman should not be al-
procured Iverson's services and 
was part of the business of Wadman, 
Statutory employer of Mr Searle 
H 40 In addition to finding Wadman to be the statutory employer of Iversori, we must determine if Argonaut, as 
Wadman's insurance provider, was required to pay workers' compensation benefits to Mr Searle Neither party con-
tests that Wadman was properly enrolled m the OCIP The renewed policy between Argonaut and Wadman became 
effective September 8, 2001, several months before the accident In the absence of the policy later becoming invalid, 
the policy requires that Argonaut pay workers' compensation insurance benefit^ for all of Wadman's employees The 
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Supplemental General Conditions for OCIP does state that failure to follow procedure, such as verifying a subcon-
tractor is enrolled, may result in the termination of coverage. The effect of this document on the policy, however, is 
unclear. In any case, Argonaut is required by law to give notice to Wadman of any policy cancellation. Section 
34A-2-205(l)(b) states that a workers' compensation insurance policy "is in effect from inception until canceled by 
filing with the division or its designee a notification of cancellation in the form prescribed by the division within ten 
days after the cancellation of a policy." Since no notice was given to Wadman by Argonaut of the insurance policy 
being cancelled, the policy is still valid. Because Wadman's policy with Argonaut was still valid and Mr. Searle was 
the statutory employee of Wadman, Argonaut must pay Mr. Searle's compensation benefits. 
*288 CONCLUSION 
II41 We find that Wadman did not have agency authority for Argonaut, that Iverson's employees were not loaned, and 
that Argonaut did not have a responsibility to ensure that Iverson was properly enrolled in the OCIP. We also find that 
there was no contract between Argonaut and Iverson. Argonaut still had a responsibility to provide insurance coverage 
for Mr. Searle, however, because Iverson and Mr. Searle were the statutory employees of Wadman and Argonaut was 
Wadman's insurance provider. Consequently, we reverse the district court decision granting Argonaut summary 
judgment and remand for action consistent with this opinion. 
H 42 Chief Justice DURHAM, Associate Chief Justice DURRANT, Justice WILKINS, and Justice PARRISH concur 
in Justice NEHRING's opinion. 
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